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The Collateral Source Rule: Double Recovery and
Indifference to Societal Interests in the Law of Tort
Damages
While society changes, the law of tort damages clings per-
sistently to the outmoded collateral source rule, struggling to jus-
tify the rule and to balance conflicting objectives of compensation
and punishment. Nineteenth century tort liability theory, predi-
cated on individualistic notions of fault, suited a time of self-help,
rugged individualism, and laissez-faire government. Punitive
objectives, predicated on moral fault, comported with the com-
pensatory purpose of tort damages because the defendant bore
the responsibility of compensating the victim. Social changes,
however, manifesting widespread insurance protection and gov-
ernment social welfare programs, shift responsibility for civil loss
to society and away from the individual tortfeasor. Vicarious lia-
bility, strict products liability, comparative negligence, no-fault
insurance, and notions of enterprise liability' further evince per-
vasive legal changes in fault liability theory. These legal and
social developments facilitate individual recovery for injuries and
spread the cost to purchasers of insurance, buyers of goods, and
taxpayers. Ensuring individual recovery and easing the burden of
compensation for the loss by spreading the cost over a wide seg-
ment of the populace are socially approved goals.2 The collateral
source rule, which forbids mention in court of plaintiff's prior
compensation for the same injury, is unresponsive to legal and
social changes invalidating the rule's punitive justification and
adds to the public expense of compensating individual civil loss.
This comment analyzes the present utility of the collateral
1. "ITihe theory of enterprise liability in torts is that losses to society created or
caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an activity, ought to be borne by that enter-
prise or activity." Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLO. L. Rzv.
153, 158 (1976).
With the present predominance of unintentional harm brought on by complex machi-
nery and technology in a congested urban society, many uncompensated personal injuries
accidently occur. Enterprise liability would establish absolute liability without fault to
ensure individual reparation and would evenly distribute the cost to society through
insurance, taxes, or the pricing mechanism of the marketplace. To balance societal inter-
ests, the collateral source rule would be abolished, and recoveries for nonpecuniary losses
such as pain and suffering would be denied. The theory is a response to a clear trend away
from the concept of fault for determining liability for tort losses. See generally Klemme,
supra.
2. See generally Henderson, "Crisis" in Accident Loss Reparations Systems: Where
We Are and How We Got There, 1976 Amz. ST. L.J. 401; O'Connell & Wilson, Public
Opinion on No-Fault Auto Insurance: A Survey of the Surveys, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 307.
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source rule and finds the rule unjustified as a means of ensuring
either punishment of the defendant or just compensation for the
plaintiff. It further examines the efficacy of subrogation in elimi-
nating the collateral source rule's vice of double recovery. The
comment concludes that legislative reform abolishing the collat-
eral source rule and subrogation in medical malpractice suits
should extend to all tort actions for personal injury, thereby en-
tirely eliminating double recovery and the consequent higher so-
cietal costs in insurance premiums, taxes, and prices.
By allowing double recovery, the collateral source rule com-
promises the strict compensatory purpose of tort damages, which
seeks to reimburse injured parties only for their actual loss.
3
Courts, invoking the collateral source rule, permit the plaintiff to
recover an award undiminished by compensatory benefits from
sources independent of the wrongdoer.' For example, A sues B for
personal injuries sustained in an auto collision. A claims, as spe-
cial damages, $500 in medical expenses and $500 in lost wages.
The collateral source rule bars B from proving that A's medical
insurance reimbursed A for medical expenses, and that A's em-
ployer continued salary payments during A's disability. Conse-
quently, A collects $1,000 from collateral sources, and $1,000 from
B's insurer, receiving a total of $2,000 for a $1,000 economic loss.
Because collateral sources reimbursed A's loss, A's additional re-
covery against B is not compensation. Instead, A's recovery is
enrichment, and B's payment appears punitive in emphasizing
the responsibility of B to pay for a loss A did not suffer.
Courts originally supported the collateral source rule because
of its punitive effect. 5 The rule was created in 1854,1 contempo-
3. James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CoNmuL L.Q. 582 (1956).
4. Courts typically emphasize what the defendant deserves to pay rather than what
the plaintiff should receive. For example:
The weight of authority is conclusive to the effect that a defendant owes to the
injured compensation for injuries, the approximate cause of which was his own
negligence, and that payment by a third party cannot relieve him of this obliga-
tion; that regardless of the motive impelling their payment, whether from affec-
tion, philanthropy or contract, the injured is the beneficiary of the bounty and
not the defendant who caused the injury.
Clark v. Berry Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262, 271, 280 N.W. 505, 510 (1938), quoted in Harvin,
The Case Against the Collateral Source Rule, 18 FED. INs. COUNSEL Q. 57, 58 (1967).
5. Early court opinions consistently required the defendant to pay for the injury. See
The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 155 (1854); Clark v. Berry
Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262, 280 N.W. 505 (1938); Perrott v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 47 (1868);
Coulter v. Township of Pine, 164 Pa. 543, 30 A. 490 (1894); Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co.,
73 Wash. 177, 131 P. 843 (1913). Later decisions more frequently avoid the punitive
justification; yet the following opinion characterizes the pervading punishment objective:
"This may permit a double recovery, but it does not impose a double burden. The tortfea-
sor bears only the single burden for his wrong. That burden is imposed by society not only
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rary with the establishment of the fault theory of liability in
1850.1 Courts perceived the collateral source rule as deterring the
socially inexpedient or wrongful conduct the new fault theory of
liability sought to identify.' Judicial policy makers morally ap-
praising B's conduct would reason B deserves to pay because
enforcing a penalty against B punishes his immoral conduct and
deters similar wrongful acts.' Courts argued that a wrongdoer
should not avoid paying full compensation for the injury merely
through the fortuitous circumstance of collateral benefits. 0 Aver-
sion to giving misbehaving defendants the mitigating benefit of
collateral compensation had more to do with permitting double
recovery than any belief in the merits of the plaintiff's entitle-
ment to enrichment." Thus, despite its violation of the compen-
satory purpose of tort damages, the collateral source rule was
embraced by courts naturally responding to the new emphasis on
identifying and preventing civil misconduct. The rule's very
adaptability to the punitive logic behind the fault theory of liabil-
ity promoted its adoption.
The scarcity of collateral sources and the types of collateral
benefits courts normally confronted also contributed to the rule's
adoption. Generally, tort liability and private resources were the
to make the plaintiff whole, but also to deter negligence and encourage due care." Gypsum
Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1962). Subordination of punish-
ment language to compensatory language indicates the shift to justifying the collateral
source rule as a compensatory tool.
6. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854). Commentators
credit this case with first applying the principles of the collateral source rule. The litiga-
tion involved a collision between a steamboat and a schooner on Lake Huron. The Court
did not offset the damage award by receipt of marine insurance proceeds. See, e.g.,
Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rv.
669, 671 n.6 (1962).
7. The theory of fault or moral blameworthiness as a condition of liability was
revolutionary in the middle 1800s. Commentators credit Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6
Cush.) 292 (1850), with dispensing with strict liability for inadvertent harm and establish-
ing the fault theory of liability. The defendant tried to break up a dog fight, and as he
raised a club to strike the dogs, he poked the plaintiff in the eye. Because he was not at
"fault," he was not liable. See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,
37 VA. L. Ray. 359, 365 (1951).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Id.
10. For example:
It would be contrary to public policy, and shocking to the sense of justice, to
hold that the proceeds of insurance paid for by the injured person for his own
benefit or that of his widow and children should inure to the benefit of, and grant
immunity to, the person whose negligence, willful or otherwise, injured him or
caused his death.
Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 186, 131 P. 843, 847 (1913).
11. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Tun LAw OF Toirs § 25.22 at 1353 (1956 ed.).
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only available sources compensating personal injury losses. 2 In
contrast to today, accident and health insurance, personal liabil-
ity insurance, work benefits, and government protection against
personal injury losses were scarce or nonexistent in 1854.' 3 When
confronted with collateral benefits, court decisions permitting
double recovery had negligible social impact because the defen-
dant, rather than a liability insurer, paid the award. The virtual
absence of liability insurance and government protection against
personal injury losses characterized the nineteenth century's val-
ued social philosophy of self-help and rugged individualism. Judi-
cial opinion naturally protected that sentiment. Courts were not
about to mitigate damages because plaintiffs received collateral
compensation from contractual arrangements, gifts from family
and friends, or public charity, thereby thwarting or discouraging
individual providence, family unity, and philanthropy."' These
collateral benefits represented individual resourcefulness in pre-
paring for accidential loss, or donative intent for the sole benefit
of the recipient. Property insurance, specifically marine and fire
insurance, was common in comparison to accident and health
insurance. 15 The right to subrogate under marine and fire insur-
ance contracts, however, granted the insurer a lien on the in-
sured's tort recovery equal to the indemnity obligation under the
insurance contract." This subrogation right avoided double re-
covery, enabled the courts to punish the defendant and still pay
homage to the compensatory purpose of tort damages, and thus
attenuated the dilemma of applying the collateral source rule.
Modern legal and social changes invalidate punitive justifi-
cations for the collateral source rule. The prevalence of inadver-
tent harm, the emphasis on securing compensation for personal
injuries, and a view of social responsibility for individual loss lead
to modern concepts of strict products liability, vicarious liability,
comparative negligence, and wider liability insurance protection
against negligence. 7 Strict liability and vicarious liability may
place legal responsibility on faultless parties. 8 Additionally, al-
lowing plaintiffs to recover under some comparative negligence
12. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 410.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. 282, 287-88, 116 A. 332, 334 (1922); Clark v.
Berry Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262, 271, 280 N.W. 505, 510 (1938).
15. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 410.
16. See W. VANcE, HAmOOK ON THE LAw OF INsuRANCE 786-90 (3d ed. 1951).
17. See generally Ehrensweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. Rav. 1422, 1425-
43 (1966).
18. W. PnossmE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRrS 459 (4th ed. 1971).
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schemes when they are more at fault than defendants" fails to
comport with any punitive function in tort law. Finally, wide-
spread liability insurance lightens a jury's task of finding fault in
the defendant10 The jury's inclination to find fault because of
liability insurance embodies values of a society demanding repa-
ration of harm and wide distribution of loss, through insurance
or the marketplace, rather than a finding of moral blameworthi-
ness." The shift in tort law towards social responsibility for indi-
vidual loss and the spread of liability insurance envelop societal
interests in private litigation and widen the gap between legal
and moral fault. Finding legal liability with less concern for find-
ing fault weakens the collateral source rule's punitive justifica-
tion because the rule cannot reform or deter faultless conduct.
Similarly, a punitive justification for the collateral source
rule is lacking in ordinary negligence cases. Defendants liable for
ordinary negligence normally do not display the malevolence nec-
essary to justify punitive damages. They are held responsible for
an error in judgment or accident proneness resulting in conduct
falling below a uniform standard of behavior.n Some opinions
insist that relieving negligent tortfeasors from civil responsibility
would encourage carelessness;23 yet, the financial protection of
liability insurance relieves negligent tortfeasors from full civil
responsibility and no demonstrable correlation exists between
insurance coverage and accident rates.2 Courts are too supposi-
tious in expecting undiminished civil liability to further deter
negligent conduct; potential civil liability is a sufficient incentive
to be careful.2 A tortfeasor's knowledge subsequentto the negli-
gent act, that a particular plaintiff is the beneficiary of collateral
benefits, will not impair the deterrent effect of civil liability.2
Even assuming full civil responsibility deters negligence,
courts should go on to determine not only who will bear the ulti-
mate financial responsibility, but also the social expense of multi-
19. See, e.g., WASH. Rzv. CODE § 4.22.010 (1976).
20. "Often it is true that liability attaches because of insurance, instead of insurance
attaching because of liability." Henderson, supra note 2, at 418.
21. See generally 2 F. HARPm & F. JAMES, supra note 11, § 25.22 at 1346.
22. Id.
23. See note 5 supra.
24. See O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Accidents: A
Proposal and an "Economic Analysis" 42 TENN. L. Rav. 145, 152-57 (1974).
25. "[lit is difficult to see how the award of damages without deducting collateral
source benefits enhances the deterrence achieved by the award of damages in the first
place." Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant
Principle and the Functional Approach, 58 KY. L.J. 36, 58 (1969).
26. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL.
L. Rav. 1478, 1483 (1966).
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ple insurance recoveries before applying the collateral source rule.
Because adequately insured tortfeasors generally do not pay com-
pensatory damage awards personally, holding them responsible
for losses collaterally compensated has no deterrent effect. True
victims of the collateral source rule are not immoral tortfeasors,
but the general populace who pay for rising insurance costs result-
ing from multiple insurance recoveries for a single claim. Simi-
larly, taxpayers pay for excessive awards assessed against public
entities because of the collateral source rule.
Public entities and insurance companies would not have to
pay excessive awards, however, if courts expressly awarded puni-
tive damages, rather than indirectly assessing punitive damages
by invoking the collateral source rule. The tortfeasor would have
to pay express punitive damages from his own resources, because
insurance protection usually does not extend to punitive dam-
ages." Absent statutory authority, public entities, like insurance
companies, are immune from assessments of punitive damages.2
8
By using the collateral source rule against insured defendants and
public entities, courts punish society because society bears the
expense of double recovery in higher insurance premiums and
higher taxes. Adherence to the collateral source rule improperly
ignores the twentieth century development of social responsibility
for individual loss, which demands realization that the public's
financial interests are involved in disputes between private liti-
gants."
Public interest in eliminating double recovery is not as great
when the defendant is neither insured nor a public entity, be-
cause the public does not pay for the injured's loss through the
defendant. Nevertheless, the wisdom of permitting double recov-
ery, even when societal interests are not integrally involved, rests
on whether tort law should punish the tortfeasor or compensate
the plaintiff.
The cardinal principle of tort law and the primary purpose
of tort damages is compensation2 ° To punish wrongdoers, courts
27. Public policy does not permit liability insurance coverage for willful and inten-
tional injuries. Punitive damages are personal punishment of the party at fault. Commen-
tators, however, have noted a trend, in some jurisdictions, allowing insurance against
punitive damages. See generally Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of
Intentional Torts, 20 HASTMGs L.J. 1219 (1969); Levit, Punitive Damages Today: What
Can be Done to Protect Against Imposition of Such Damages, 1972 INs. L.J. 211.
28. See, e.g., Euge v. Trantina, 422 F.2d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1970); Fox v. City of
West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith v. District of Columbia, 336
A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309 A.2d 339, 345-46 (Me. 1973).
Contra, Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 620-22 (Iowa 1978).
29. See Fleming, supra note 26, at 1480.
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were willing to ignore the collateral source rule's compromise of
compensatory objectives. Now that legal responsibility increas-
ingly falls on relatively faultless defendants and the public in-
creasingly bears the cost of double recovery,"' lawmakers should
remember the first priority of tort law is compensation, not pun-
ishment of tortfeasors or enrichment of plaintiffs. Moreover, pu-
nitive damage awards 2 or, alternatively, criminal penalties are
more discriminate means of punishing wrongdoers than the col-
lateral source rule. Thus, although society may not have a direct
interest in every suit, adherence to the compensatory purpose of
tort damages and alternatives for effectuating punishment justify
abolition of the collateral source rule.
Reluctant to abandon the collateral source rule, modern
courts find the rule serves "legitimate" compensatory objec-
tives.3 Courts contend legal compensation never adequately com-
pensates, and the collateral source rule allows a closer approxi-
mation of full compensation for injuries.' Jurists reason attorney
30. "A cardinal principle of law is that in the absence of punitive damages a plaintiff
can recover no more than the loss actually suffered." Snowden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc.,
454 F.2d 1047, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The primary object of an award of damages in a civil action and the fundamen-
tal principle or theory on which it is based is just compensation, indemnity, or
reparation for the loss or injury sustained by the injured party, so that he may
be made whole, and restored, as nearly as possible to the position or condition
he was prior to the injury.
25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (1966). See also C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK O THE LAw OF DAmAGs
§§ 20, 137 (1935); W. Paossma, supra note 18, at 552; James, supra note 3, at 582.
31. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
32. Dean Prosser finds even punitive damages an anomalous practice of tort law. Tort
law's function is not to punish. Rather, criminal law, with its procedural safeguards,
provides the system for exacting punishment. See W. PRossmi, supra note 18, at 9-14.
Another writer states the same idea as follows:
The aim of the criminal law . . . is to protect the public against harm, by
punishing harmful results of conduct. . . . The function of tort law is to com-
pensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suffered. . . . With crimes
. . . there is emphasis on a bad mind, on immorality. With torts the emphasis
is more on "the adjustment of the conflicting interests of individuals to achieve
a desirable social result," with morality taking on less importance.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CmiNAL LAw 11 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61,
84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970). The court states:
Although we recognize that in the past a primitive moralism may have engen-
dered the collateral source rule to serve punitive ends, we suggest below that
the rule still serves not mere punitive purposes, but legitimate objectives that
may or may not survive the spread of a philosophy of social insurance.
Id. at 4 n.8, 465 P.2d at 65 n.8, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 177 n.8.
34. See, e.g., Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257, 270 (3rd Cir. 1973); Gypsum
Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1962); Grayson v. Williams, 256
F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958); Rayfield v. Lawrence, 253 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1958); Hudson
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expenses contribute to the inadequacy of the award.s Moreover,
courts argue that bodily functions are priceless and that any
award for a permanent disabling injury is insufficient." In all of
these instances courts fail to analyze the collateral source rule
directly; rather they indulge in evasive analysis of the rule's indi-
rect effect on other deficiencies in the law.
The collateral source rule is a haphazard answer to present
methods of allocating attorney costs.37 Courts suggest the prevail-
ing plaintiff's payment of attorney expenses results in undercom-
pensation and receipt of collateral benefits results in overcompen-
sation - the net effect an equitable balanceM Courts, therefore,
concede the collateral source rule and payment of attorney expen-
ses transgress compensatory principles, but apparently believe
the violations of compensatory principles are justified because
the two transgressions cancel each other. Attorney fees are too
often the ruse under which courts justify other noncompensatory
practices, such as pain and suffering damages,3' punitive dam-
v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Rose v. Hakim, 335 F. Supp. 1221, 1236
(D.D.C. 1971); Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 465 P.2d 61,
68, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 180 (1970); Theobold v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 239, 208 A.2d 129,
134 (1965).
35. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Helfend v.
Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 465 P.2d 61, 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 180
(1970).
36. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d at 346; Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d at 8, 465 P.2d at 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
37. The [Hudson] [c]ourt proceeds to state that legal compensation for
personal injuries does not wholly compensate because the injured person seldom
gets the full compensation that he recovers since a substantial attorney's fee
comes out of it. This. . . reasoning is not convincing. If the law were to make
the plaintiff whole and include attorney's fees, our law should be modified in
accordance with the English practice ....
Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644 (D.D.C. 1965).
38. See Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Helfend v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 465 P.2d 61, 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 180 (1970).
Increasing legal insurance weakens arguments for continuing noncompensatory practices
because of the cost of litigation. Predictions are that in ten years one out of every four
Americans will participate in some prepaid legal service plan. Kirby, Prepaid Legal Serv-
ices and the Insurance Industry, 12 FORUM 324, 328-29 (1976).
39. One commentator asserts that pain and suffering awards are not compensatory
because such awards do not replace what is lost or make the plaintiff whole. He suggests
that pain and suffering awards ensure adequate compensation by supplementing compen-
satory damages for pecuniary losses. Further, pain and suffering awards finance
contingent-fee litigation, because without them attorney fees would come out of an award
for compensatory damages. D. Doaus, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 550 (1973).
Another writer takes a different view:
Do [juries] . . . actually award fees? The answer is not simple. They frequently
discuss them in the deliberation; they see no impropriety in so doing. They are
frequently well informed, although not always, about the level of contingent fees
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ages," and not reducing awards by tax savings." Considering all
the offsets courts permit, the defendant might advantageously
pay the prevailing plaintiff's attorney costs, if the plaintiff's total
recovery otherwise was made compensatory by denying punitive
damages and reducing the recovery by collateral benefits and tax
savings. Courts should urge direct reform if payment of attorney
expenses by prevailing parties results in inequities. Collateral
benefits are a haphazard answer because they are not available
in every suit to offset the litigation expense.
Courts further contend the impossibility of complete com-
pensation for many injuries justifies the collateral source rule
because overcompensation never occurs.'" They insist that gen-
eral damage awards" inadequately compensate severe permanent
injuries that cause continuing physical pain, mental anguish, or
an inability to enjoy life. Collateral benefits, however, usually
reimburse items of special damages" such as hospitalization and
other medical expenses or lost income. To the extent collateral
benefits cover medical expenses and lost income, plaintiff suffers
today. Does this then mean that awards are higher by the amount of the fee?
We seriously doubt it.
Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and The Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 01o ST. L.J.
158, 176 (1958).
Yet, appellate judges have considered attorney's fees in determining whether an
award is excessive:
Moreover, although there is no legal basis for the inclusion of an attorney's fee
in the judgment it is a matter of common knowledge that in personal injury
actions lawyers do not customarily perform service for the plaintiff gratui-
tously. . . Such circumstances cannot be ignored by the writer in performing
his part of this Appellate Court's duty to determine whether the judgment is so
grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience.
Renuart Lumber Yards, Inc. v. Levine, 49 So. 2d 97, 102 (Fla. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
See also United States v. Jacobs, 308 F.2d 906, 907 n.1 (5th Cir. 1962).
40. A court approved the following jury instruction: "If you allow punitive damages
in this case then in assessing such damage you may take into consideration the following
items: 1. The probable and reasonable expense of the litigation including attorney's fees
... Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96, 98, 434 P.2d 828, 829 (1967).
Similarly: "[A]s a general rule in cases where exemplary damages are justified, the award
of such damages should approximate (1) reasonable and necessary attorney's fees ..
Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 710, 496 P.2d 939, 947 (1972).
41. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960).
Damages received for personal injuries are tax exempt. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
42. "[Nlot many people would sell an arm for the average or even the maximum
amount that juries award for loss of an arm." Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
43. General damages are the natural and proximate results of personal injury. An
example is pain. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 30, § 8 at 34-35.
44. Special damages are unusual losses, of which without specific notice the defen-
dant would have no knowledge. Special damages include loss of time and earnings, expen-
ses of drugs, nursing, and medical care. Id. at 37.
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no economic loss. Permitting the plaintiff double recovery on
these items of special damages does increase his overall recovery,
but does not affirmatively remedy the perceived inadequacy of
general damage awards. Rather than focusing on methods for
adequately measuring general damages, the courts allow recovery
for losses which simply do not exist. Even if courts apply the
collateral source rule to remedy perceived deficiencies in general
damages, collateral benefits, while becoming more common, are
not prevalent enough to either meet the problem adequately or
justify the rule's existence. If courts seriously contend jury awards
fall short of reasonable compensation and are not simply groping
for support for an obsolete rule, they should solve the problem of
adequate compensation by direct reform having universal appli-
cation.
The California Supreme Court in Helfend v. Southern Cali-
fornia Rapid Transit District" articulated additional compensa-
tory justifications for the collateral source rule. The court be-
lieved rewarding plaintiff's foresight in purchasing insurance pro-
tection was a legitimate objective." Viewing insurance as an in-
vestment, the court reasoned that if collateral benefits mitigated
damages, the plaintiff's investment would have earned no bene-
fit. Error lies in assuming the plaintiff received no value for the
insurance premiums. Ordinarily plaintiffs do not pay insurance
premiums as a wager on the chance of double recovery, but for
the security of prompt compensation for personal injury without
the uncertainty of litigation and without regard to the personal
wealth of prospective defendants.'7
The Helfend court also reasoned that the collateral source
rule performs a needed function in computing general damages.
Generally, a jury's failure to award general damages, in the face
of a substantial award of special damages, results in an improper
or irregular verdict." An award for general damages is then some-
what dependent on the existence and amount of special damages.
Thus, the cost of medical care, as an item of special damages,
provides attorneys and juries an important measure for assessing
the plaintiff's general damages. 9 The court implied that reduc-
tion or elimination of hospitalization expenses by collateral medi-
cal payments distorts measurement of pain and suffering. Inex-
pensive injuries are not painful, is the apparent logic. Assuming
45. 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
46. Id. at 6, 465 P.2d at 66, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
47. Harvin, supra note 4, at 65.
48. Smith v. Blair, 521 P.2d 581 (Wyo. 1974).
49. 2 Cal. 3d at 8, 465 P.2d at 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
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the court is correct in believing that evidence of special damages
is necessary to determine the amount of general damages, elimi-
nation of the collateral source rule will not prevent such a show-
ing. Presumably, absent the collateral source rule, plaintiff will
prove his medical expenses, lost wages, and other items of special
damages; defendant will then rebut plaintiff's claim for special
damages by showing plaintiff received reimbursement from col-
lateral sources. Permitting the defendant to present evidence of
collateral benefits to show the plaintiff did not suffer lost wages
or the expense of medical care does not deny a disabling injury.
Evidence of hospital care and absence from work, together with
medical evidence substantiating the seriousness of the injury
should support a general damage award, despite a reduction of
special damages resulting from rejection of the collateral source
rule. 0
Finally, the Helfend court argued that the collateral source
rule provides needed additional compensation to offset statutory
subrogation.5' When a provider of collateral benefits has a subro-
gation right permitting it to reach any recovery indiscriminate of
the recovery's purpose or nature, 5 then the collateral source rule
ensures plaintiffs will receive just compensation. For example,
suppose A's total loss is $1,000. A receives $500 from a work-
men's compensation fund. If the court permits A to use the col-
lateral source rule to bar B from presenting evidence of collateral
benefits, A will recover $1,000. Subrogation rights entitle the
state workmen's compensation fund to recover $500 from A. This
leaves A a total recovery of $1,000 for a $1,000 loss. Whereas, if
the courts do not permit A to use the collateral source rule to
exclude evidence of this collateral compensation, A will only
recover $500 from B, which A must relinquish to the state work-
50. "The award of damages for pain [and] suffering . . . [is] somewhat arbitrary,
[and] depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case . . . ... Rhymes v. Guidry,
84 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. Ct. of App. 1955). The damage award "must rest in the discretion
of the jury, guided by common sense." Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 342,
229 P.2d 560, 563 (1951).
51. [Tlhe collateral source rule lies between two systems for the compensa-
tion of accident victims: the traditional tort recovery based on fault and the
increasingly prevalent coverage based on non-fault insurance. Neither system
possesses such universality of coverage or completeness of compensation that we
can easily dispense with the collateral source rule's approach to meshing the two
systems.
2 Cal. 3d at 9, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
52. In Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement Sys., 58 Cal. 2d 618, 375 P.2d 442, 25
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1962), the California Supreme Court interpreted CAL. LABOR CODR § 3856
(West 1971) as authorizing a state employees' retirement fund, obligated to pay disability
retirement compensation, to attach a lien to a state employee's judgment against a tort-
feasor "for any damages."
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men's compensation fund. A's net compensation is $500, for a
$1,000 loss. State law allowing subrogation permits this result if
the lien attaches to any recovery. Such a law fails to consider
that the judge or jury already reduced A's tort recovery by the
collateral benefits received from the workmen's compensation
fund, thereby inequitably requiring A to relinquish his remain-
ing tort recovery. Thus, subrogation perpetuates the collateral
source rule. The judiciary will not repeal the collateral source
rule because they cannot concurrently control subrogation
rights.53 To eliminate double recovery efficiently, state legisla-
tors must abolish the collateral source rule and repeal statutory
subrogation rights. Courts can then easily bar enforcement of
contractual subrogation agreements." Subrogation theory re-
quires the obligations of the insurer and the tortfeasor to the
injured party be the same." The insurer then, to the extent of his
obligation under the insurance contract, may assert the insured's
cause of action against the tortfeasor. Absent the collateral source
rule, however, the tortfeasor is obligated to the injured party only
to the extent of any deficiency in effective insurance coverage.56
Therefore, because the insured has no cause of action against the
tortfeasor for the amount of collateral benefits, the insurer has no
rights against the tortfeasor.
Insurance companies, of course, would oppose vehemently
such a proposal. They would argue that denying first party insur-
ers57 contractual subrogation rights is counterproductive to reduc-
ing insurance rates. This argument presupposes subrogation re-
53. Without a thorough revolution in the American approach to torts and
the consequent damages, the rule . . . has become so integrated within our
present system that its precipitous judicial nullification would work hardship
... . The reforms which many academicians propose cannot readily be
achieved through piecemeal common law development.
Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d at 9, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr.
at 189.
54. Commercial law, by analogy, provides support for this conclusion. See U.C.C. §
2-510(3) (1972 version) (antisubrogation clause).
55. W. VANce, supra note 16, at 787. Subrogation rights usually do not exist outside
express statutory authority or property insurance. Life and accident and health insurers
are not in theory entitled to subrogation. Id. The terms of life and accident and health
insurance contracts fix the amount payable by life or accident insurers, whereas assess-
ment of the insured's actual loss determines the amount payable by the property insurer.
Id. Accident and health insurers, however, increasingly provide for subrogation in the
insurance contract. Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 32 INs. CoUN-
sn J. 32, 33 (1965).
56. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-510(3) (1972 version) (antisubrogation clause).
57. First party insurance is coverage under which the policyholder collects payments
for his losses from his own insurance company, rather than from the insurance company
of some other person who caused the accident.
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coveries effectively reduce rates. Whether subrogation recoveries
significantly contribute to rate structuring of accident and health
policies is doubtful. Jurisdictions are split on the validity of sub-
rogation agreements in accident and health insurance contracts.58
A minority of states invalidate subrogation agreements, relying
on the common law prohibition on assignments of causes of actionfor personal injuries."' A majority of states, however, condone
express subrogation provisions as an equitable remedy barring
double recovery. 0 Although relevant data is inconclusive, rates
probably will not be measurably affected in those jurisdictions
permitting subrogation. One reported unofficial estimate shows
that "systematic subrogation recoveries would not reduce themonthly contribution to the Kaiser Health Plan by more thanfour cents."'" Another unofficial estimate reports subrogation re-
coveries on automobile damage claims represent 8.56% of paidloss, and recoveries on workmen's compensation claims represent
2.45% of paid loss.2 Still another study finds "that aggregated
subrogation collections . . . are relatively unimportant for somebroad classes of insurance."" These statistics and conclusions are
attributable to the failure of insurance companies to investigateclaims and subrogation opportunities, the economic impractical-
ity of pursuing litigation, and more simply the fact that many
injuries are not tort-induced." The foregoing might reasonably
lead one to conclude insurance companies' rates already reflect
the broadest risk - the risk of loss without the possibility of
subrogation. That being true, any argument for raising rates be-
cause of a denial of subrogation rights is unpersuasive.
Conversely, the collateral source rule more directly affectsliability insurance rates because a closer correlation exists be-tween the liability insurer's loss experience and the practice of
excluding evidence of collateral benefits. Unlike the impact ofsubrogation rights on a first party insurer's loss experience, theimpact of the collateral source rule on a damage award is notcontingent upon economic considerations or an insurance com-
pany's initiative, but rather is judicially imposed as an eviden-
tiary rule. Thus, an increase in damage awards because of the
58. See Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems Arising From Subroga-tion Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 M~m. L. Rzv. 255, 259 (1971).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Fleming, supra note 26, at 1503 n.92.
62. Meyers, Subrogation Rights and Recoveries Arising Out of First Party Contracts,
9 FoRuM 83, 85 (1973).
63. R. HoRN, SUBROGATION iN INSuRANCE THERY AND PRACTICE 191 (1964).
64. See Meyers, supra note 61, at 85-86.
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collateral source rule is more apt to occur than a decrease in loss
experiences of first party insurers because of subrogation. There-
fore, an approach to double recovery abolishing the collateral
source rule and subrogation is preferable to offsetting the collat-
eral source rule with subrogation because it is more economically
effective in reducing the public expense of double recovery and
it ensures the injured party is made as whole as our jurisprudence
can assure.
Rather than urge abolition of the collateral source rule and
subrogation rights, some commentators advocate extension of
subrogation as the solution to double recovery. 5 These commen-
tators believe subrogation is a "neat device"" balancing punitive
65. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 6, at 694. Dean Maxwell advocates the collateral
source rule: "For the present system, however, the rule seems to perform a needed func-
tion. At the very least, it removes some complex issues from the trial scene. At its best,
in some cases, it operates as an instrument of what most of us would be willing to call
justice." Id. at 695.
He also advocates subrogation as the solution to double recovery: "The existence of
the right of subrogation would enable the courts to place liability for damage on the
wrongdoer and yet to pay homage to the equally attractive idea of damages which are
simply compensatory as far as the injured party is concerned." Id. at 683.
Commentators have urged other solutions. Professor Sedler bases his "functional
approach" on a common sense appraisal of the propriety of double recovery: "[Clonsider
the nature of the benefit and the economic and practical factors involved and then con-
clude how receipt of that benefit should affect recovery of personal injury damages."
Sedler, supra note 25, at 63. He uses insurance premiums as an example:
[The effect is] that the plaintiff purchased the insurance for the benefit of the
defendant. This was not his intention of course, but the insurance is available
to meet a loss that the defendant would otherwise have had to meet under
principles of tort liability. Since that loss was met by insurance, the plaintiff
has no need to recover it from the defendant. But since the plaintiff's insurance
has rebounded to the benefit of the defendant by relieving him of a portion of
his liability, it seems only fair that the defendant pay for the insurance protec-
tion.
. . . [HIe should reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of the insurance under
a restitutionary theory.
Id. at 89-90. Sedler's creative and simple idea is facially appealing, but one must question
the assumption that the plaintiff received no value for the premiums. The plaintiff re-
ceived value from the security of knowing compensation would be forthcoming for acciden-
tal losses, regardless of whether or not tort-induced.
Professor Fleming would probably see this plan as a worthless endeavor:
[Unofficial estimates show] that systematic subrogation recoveries would not
reduce the monthly contribution to the Kaiser Health Plan by more than four
cents. This throws some incidental light on how negligible is the proportionate
cost of tort-proved accidents, and should give pause to those who argue that
reducing the tortfeasor's liability by the benefits the plaintiff has received from
an accident policy would unfairly divert to him the plaintiff's own expenditures.
Fleming, supra note 26, at 1503 n.92. Apparently, the California Legislature agrees with
Professor Sedler. See note 77 infra.
66. Fleming, supra note 26, at 1498.
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and compensatory objectives of tort law which are rendered in-
compatible by the collateral source rule. Subrogation allows
courts to forget nagging doubts about unjust enrichment of the
plaintiff, and still place liability for all damages on the wrong-
doer." Thus, those advocating subrogation as a solution to double
recovery are not focusing on the public expense as a problem
arising from the collateral source rule, but instead are concerned
with imperfections the rule creates in tort law's compensatory
objective.
Although subrogation eliminates some double recovery, abol-
ishing both the collateral source rule and subrogation would more
efficiently eliminate all double recovery. Extending subrogation
to offset the collateral source rule eliminates double recovery only
when the provider of collateral benefits asserts a subrogation
right acquired by statute or contract. The mere availability of
enforceable contractual subrogation rights does not ensure all
providers of collateral benefits will contract for the right. For
example, a physician rendering gratuitous medical services to a
colleague or an employer gratuitously continuing salary pay-
ments to a disabled employee will not make contractual arrange-
ments with the beneficiary regarding any potential tort recover-
ies. Abolishing the collateral source rule, conversely, avoids dou-
ble recovery independent of any contractual arrangements be-
tween the source of collateral benefits and the injured. Subroga-
tion can also foment litigation because an insurer, for example,
may pressure an insured to bring a tort action against the third
party to enable the insurer to attach a lien to the tort recovery. 8
If subrogation rights do not attach to the plaintiff's recovery and
state legislatures abolish the collateral source rule, claimants are
more likely to settle before trial because there is a single plaintiff
with a loss already partly satisfied and therefore a smaller claim.1"
Finally, subrogation, which most often simply transfers money
from defendant's to plaintiff's insurer, adds the administrative
cost of investigating subrogation opportunities and litigating
claims to the public expense.7 0 No social gain derives from making
the shift because either insurer can effectively spread the loss."
Abolition of both the collateral source rule and subrogation elimi-
nates double recovery without the additional administrative ex-
67. See Maxwell, supra note 6, at 683.
68. Fleming, supra note 26, at 1526.
69. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 11, § 25.23 at 1356.
70. "[Subrogation] simply takes money from one of a man's pockets and puts it in
one of his others." Id. § 25.23 at 1360.
71. See generally id. § 25.23 at 1355-60.
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pense. Diplomatic deference to views that courts should not re-
lieve tortfeasors of any portion of their liability"' appears the only
reason commentators urge adoption of subrogation to negate dou-
ble recovery, instead of urging direct repeal of the collateral
source rule.
Responding to a demand for lower medical malpractice in-
surance costs, state legislatures are beginning to sanction the
admission of evidence of collateral benefits in medical malprac-
tice suits. 3 State legislators are finding the number of personal
injury suits and the size of judgments have increased the cost of
liability coverage to such an extent that it is no longer in the
public interest to allow double recovery.7' The resulting statutory
treatment of collateral benefits in medical malpractice suits var-
ies amongst the states. 5
Legislators could write an ideal statute by combining fea-
tures of the Iowa,7" Alaska," and California 78 statutes and elimi-
72. "In view of the manifest strength and sincerity with which this viewpoint is
entertained, it might be thought:idle, if not tactless, to challenge the assumptions on
which it evidently rests." Fleming, supra note 26, at 1483.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARiz. Rav. STAT. § 12-567 (Supp.
1976-77); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6862 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); KAN. STAT. § 60-
471 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4010
(McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page Supp. 1977); 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.602 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34
(Supp. 1977); S.D. CoMPuED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12 (Supp. 1977); TEN. CODE ANN. § 23-
3418 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1977).
74. See, e.g., H.R. 1494, 44th Wash. Legis., 2d Ex. Sesa. (1975-1976). (The Washing-
ton Legislature rejected the bill because the proposed reforms swept too broadly in
regulating attorney fees and attempting to eliminate awards for pain and suffering. In-
stead, the Washington Legislature enacted the more moderate Substitute House Bill No.
1470, which retained similar treatment of the collateral source rule.).
75. Some statutes totally abrogate the collateral source rule in medical malpractice
suits. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Others allow
presentation of evidence of collateral benefits to the jury without imposition of a direct
offset. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1977). Other statutes credit plaintiffs
for any contributory costs in obtaining collateral benefits, and abolish subrogation rights.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1978). Still others permit recovery of the
amount of collateral benefits when necessary to offset statutory subrogation rights. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
76. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
77. (b) Except when the collateral source is a federal program which by law
must seek subrogation and except death benefits paid under life insurance, a
claimant may only recover damages from the defendant which exceed amounts
received by the claimant as compensation for his injuries from collateral sources,
whether private, group or governmental, and whether contributory or noncon-
tributory. Evidence of collateral sources, other than a federal program which
must by law seek subrogation and the death benefit paid under life insurance,
is admissible after the fact finder has rendered an award.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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nating the limitation to medical malpractice suits. First, to eradi-
cate double recovery adequately, the statute must include collat-
eral benefits from nearly every source." The Iowa statute is an
example:
[Tihe damages awarded shall not include actual economic
losses incurred or to be incurred in the future by the claimant
by reason of the personal injury, including but not limited to,the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitation
services, and custodial care, and the loss of services and loss ofearned income, to the extent that those losses are replaced or areindemnified by insurance, or by governmental, employment, orservice benefit programs or from any other source except the
assets of the claimant or of the members of the claimant's im-
mediate family.0
The general language - "or from any other source" - is broad
enough to encompass most sources of collateral benefits including
gratuities from all but the immediate family. The narrowly
drafted Washington statute,81 by comparison, fails to include in-
surance proceeds paid for by the plaintiff or his employer. Sec-
ond, state legislatures must provide a procedure for admitting
78. (a) In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury
against a health care provider based upon professional negligence, he may intro-
duce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of
the personal injury pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any stateor federal income disability or worker's compensation act, any health, sickness
or income-disability insurance, accident insurance that provides health benefits
or income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group,
organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse thecost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services. Where the defen-
dant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce evidence ofany amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure his right toany insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has introduced evidence.
(b) No source of collateral benefits introduced pursuant to subdivision (a)
shall recover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiff against a defendant.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1978).
79. Life insurance proceeds are not properly a collateral benefit. Life insurance ismore akin to the assets, investments, or vested interests of the plaintiff. See W. VANcE,
supra note 16, at 797.
80. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
81. Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the patient hasalready been compensated for the injury complained of from any source, except
the assets of the patient, his representative, or his immediate family, or insur-ance purchased with such assets. In the event such evidence is admitted, theplaintiff may present evidence of an obligation to repay such compensation.
Insurance bargained for or provided on behalf of an employee shall be considered
insurance purchased with the assets of the employee.
WASH. Rav. CODE § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1977).
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evidence of collateral benefits to mitigate damages. The Alaska
statute is an example of a good approach. In Alaska, a jury hears
no evidence of collateral benefits, but renders an award as if the
collateral source rule were in force. This measure avoids confusing
the jury by complicating the damage issue with double recovery
considerations. After the jury renders an award the judge hears
evidence of collateral benefits. The judge then reduces the recov-
ery by the amount of compensation from collateral sources; the
statute does not leave this decision to the whim or comprehension
of the jury. Finally, to ensure plaintiffs receive adequate compen-
sation after repeal of the collateral source rule, the statute must
deny subrogation rights.82 The subrogation right may be a lien on
the insured's recovery against the tortfeasor, an equitable interest
in the insured's recovery by virtue of a trust agreement, or a claim
requiring intervention in the injured's private action.83 The Cali-
fornia statute comprehensively denies these rights: "No source of
collateral benefits . . .shall recover any amount against the
plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff
against a defendant." The California statute additionally per-
mits the plaintiff to recover contributory costs, such as insurance
premiums, expended in procuring the collateral benefit. This pro-
posed statute mitigates damages by collateral benefits, denies
subrogation rights, and permits the plaintiff to recover contribu-
tory costs, thus striking a balance between the public's interest
in limiting damage awards and the injured party's interest in just
compensation.
The confounding feature of existing state statutes is their
limitation to medical malpractice suits. Legislatures overlook
that the reasons underlying abolition of the collateral source rule
in medical malpractice suits also apply to other types of tort
actions. Rising liability insurance costs due to double recovery are
not unique to medical malpractice insurance. Nor are the puni-
tive justifications for the collateral source rule more appropriate
outside medical malpractice litigation. A negligent physician is
no less culpable than a negligent truck driver. State legislatures
probably limited these statutes to medical malpractice suits be-
cause political pressures narrowly focused on the medical com-
munity's demands for lower malpractice insurance costs" and
82. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
83. Capwell & Greenwald, supra note 57, at 257.
84. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1978).
85. The medical malpractice insurance crisis, however, does not simply pose an eco-
nomic problem. The Washington Legislature was also concerned that physicians might
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diverted legislative attention from the broader implications of
double recovery. Because medical malpractice suits are not fairly
distinguishable from other personal injury actions, these statutes
should extend to all tort actions for personal injury.
In conclusion, the collateral source rule, justified upon an
irrelevant morality that tort law must punish "bad" people, cor-
rupts the compensatory purpose of tort damages and ignores the
societal costs of personal injury recoveries. The rule is archaic and
has no place in modern society. Insurance protection, employ-
ment benefits, and government aid evince widespread social com-
pensation providing adequate individual compensation for nearly
every kind of accidental loss. Society's shift from individual to
collective loss bearing invalidates the postulate that tort law
should punish individual tortfeasors by not allowing collateral
benefits to mitigate damages. Increasing no-fault liability also
characterizes the move to social responsibility for individual
losses. Tort liability fast is shedding vestiges of its punitive func-
tion.N Consequently, as the medical malpractice crisis demon-
strates, tort law's focus should be on reducing the higher cost of
individual reparation, while at the same time ensuring that in-
jured parties recover all economic losses.
Recent judicial opinions frequently abandon punitive justifi-
cations for the collateral source rule, but insist the rule's elimina-
tion will be counterproductive to adequate compensation. 7 If the
law falls short of full compensation, then changes in practices for
payment of attorney fees and in the juries' system of computing
damages are preferable to leaving "adequate" compensation to
the chance of double recovery.
Commentary against the collateral source rule criticizes
judicial treatment of double recovery, characterizing it as
limit or eliminate certain helpful health services because insurance coverage against po-
tential risk of injury to the patient is too expensive. H.R. 1494, 44th Wash. Legis., 2d Ex.
Sess. (1975-1976). See note 73 supra.
While other purchasers of liability insurance may not provide as important public
services as physicians, they also feel the financial impact of liability insurance rates and
as a consequence may find it necessary to also curtail certain activities. For example, a
Washington automobile driver, unable to afford exorbitant insurance rates, must limit or
stop driving unless willing to risk suspension of his license if involved in an accident. See
WASH. Rzv. CODE §§ 46.29.110, 170 (1976).
86. "[It may be that] tort liability will become only an excess or a guarantee liabil-
ity, its function being merely to allot responsibility for compensation to a person . . . to
the extent that the cost of compensation has not been met by another source." Fleming,
supra note 26, at 1549.
87. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
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"irresponsible social engineering." 8  Perhaps the collateral source
rule is so embedded in the written law, through statutory subro-
gation rights, that courts cannot effectively achieve judicial nulli-
fication of double recovery."' Still, even if only to spur legislative
action, courts should take a stance more cognizant of the social
implications of double recovery beyond the impact of liability on
private litigants. As one court has stated:
We see no compelling reason for providing the injured party
with double recovery for his lost employment; no compelling'
reason of deterrence or retribution against the responsible party
in the case, and we are not in the business of redistributing the
wealth beyond the goal of making the victim whole."
William A. Olson
88. Fleming, supra note 26, at 1484.
89. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
90. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542
F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976) (The EEOC sued on behalf of a victim of racial discrimination,
seeking back wages. Collateral benefits were state unemployment compensation.).
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